China launches WAICO as Xi urges global AI cooperation, challenging US tech dominance
China launches WAICO at the Shanghai summit as President Xi calls for AI cooperation, warning against single-country dominance and advocating people-centred safeguards for the technology.
President Xi Jinping used the World Artificial Intelligence Conference in Shanghai on July 17, 2026, to call for reinforced international AI cooperation and to present a vision that counters unilateral dominance in the sector. His remarks coincided with Beijing’s unveiling of the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organisation (WAICO), formally established on July 16, 2026, and attended by senior international figures including United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres. The formation of WAICO and Xi’s speech mark a deliberate push by China to shape the rules and institutions that will govern artificial intelligence globally.
Xi frames AI as a shared historic opportunity
Xi told delegates at WAIC that artificial intelligence should be treated as an open, cooperative endeavour rather than the preserve of any single nation. He argued for a “people-centred” approach that keeps AI systems under human control and urged safeguards such as regulation, technological monitoring, early-warning systems and emergency responses. His language directly criticised the overextension of national-security justifications in technological governance, a likely reference to measures taken by other states.
WAICO founding members and stated goals
The intergovernmental World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organisation was launched with 29 founding countries and is headquartered in Shanghai. The founding membership includes a number of Global South nations such as Indonesia, Brazil, Malaysia, South Africa, Senegal, Russia and Pakistan, signalling Beijing’s effort to build a broad-based coalition. WAICO’s stated objectives are to facilitate international cooperation, promote equitable access to AI capacity-building and develop regulatory frameworks intended to keep AI development safe and beneficial.
Geopolitical intent behind the alliance
Analysts say WAICO positions China to influence international norms and multilateral debate on AI at forums such as the United Nations. By assembling a bloc of middle- and low-income countries, Beijing may be seeking to secure voting weight and diplomatic leverage that could shape global governance outcomes. The timing — with WAICO formed on July 16 and Xi’s high-profile address the following day — underscores Beijing’s intent to present an alternative to existing Western-led tech governance structures.
Economic and technical strengths bolstering China’s push
China has invested heavily to build a domestically sustained AI ecosystem that spans chip development, datacentre capacity and consumer deployment. While the United States retains an advantage in the most advanced semiconductors, China leads in large-scale data-centre infrastructure and in the production of critical rare earth minerals that underpin chip manufacture. An ample supply of electricity and state-led investments in the power grid have also helped Beijing meet the substantial energy demands of training and operating large AI models.
Technology restrictions and the ‘chip war’ context
The announcement comes against a backdrop of rising technology restrictions and trade tensions between Washington and Beijing. In May 2026, the U.S. Department of Commerce affirmed controls on shipments of key semiconductors to certain Chinese-affiliated firms, citing national-security concerns, and Beijing has responded with export measures affecting dual-use technologies and critical minerals. Those actions have sharpened competition over supply chains and prompted both sides to shore up domestic capabilities in chips and other core technologies.
Implications for global AI governance and developing countries
WAICO’s emphasis on equitable access and capacity-building aims to attract nations that view existing standards-setting processes as dominated by Western powers. For developing countries, the promise of training, infrastructure and regulatory input from China may be politically and economically attractive. Observers caution, however, that competing governance visions — one state-centric and the other more market- or multilateral-oriented — could complicate international coordination on issues such as safety standards, export controls, and the military applications of AI.
China’s public diplomacy at WAIC combined technological showpieces with strategic messaging intended to broaden its influence in AI policymaking. The presence of the UN secretary-general at the founding event lent institutional weight to WAICO, even as debates continue over which multilateral frameworks will carry authority on global AI rules.
China will now face the practical challenge of translating diplomatic commitments into operational cooperation that reassures partners about safety, transparency and non-coercive use of AI. Whether WAICO can gain traction as a norm-setting body will depend on its ability to deliver capacity-building, mediate standards across diverse legal systems, and demonstrate independent governance mechanisms beyond bilateral influence.
As countries weigh the balance between technological opportunity and national security, the creation of WAICO and Xi’s appeal for AI cooperation are likely to intensify diplomatic engagement on the future of artificial intelligence. The coming months will test whether this new organisation can convert rhetoric into durable international frameworks or whether competing blocs will harden around differing regulatory models.