U.S. intelligence warns Mojtaba Khamenei is more inclined to pursue a nuclear weapon
U.S. intelligence warns Mojtaba Khamenei is likelier than his father to seek a nuclear weapon, raising concern about Iran’s safeguarded nuclear sites.
Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, Iran’s new supreme leader, is assessed by American intelligence to be more receptive than his predecessor to pursuing a nuclear weapon, officials briefed on the matter say. The finding has sharpened concern in Washington about Tehran’s nuclear intentions and the security of sites where centrifuges and material have been relocated.
U.S. intelligence assessment
In classified assessments shared with senior officials, U.S. agencies conclude that Mojtaba Khamenei displays greater interest in advanced nuclear weaponry than the late Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Analysts stress that much of the intelligence reflects pre-war intercepts and statements, but they argue the pattern points toward a harder-line tilt within the leadership.
U.S. officials also note that Mojtaba Khamenei’s public remarks stop short of openly calling for a bomb, creating an intelligence problem of signaling versus intent. His reduced public visibility since being wounded early in the conflict limits direct observation and complicates efforts to determine how much authority he currently wields.
Movement of centrifuges to Pickaxe Mountain
American sources report that Iran has transferred at least some centrifuges and related equipment to a heavily fortified underground complex commonly referred to by U.S. agencies as Pickaxe Mountain. The move is seen by U.S. analysts as an effort to preserve key assets from aerial strikes rather than an immediate step to resume enrichment.
The underground complex is described as significantly deeper and better protected than facilities previously struck, making it a more challenging target for conventional munitions. Iran has also reportedly positioned ground forces near the site to deter any commando-style raid, underscoring Tehran’s concern about vulnerability to direct action.
Damage from 2025 strikes and program delay
Last year’s U.S. strikes on Fordo, Natanz and Isfahan inflicted measurable damage and temporarily set back Iran’s enrichment activities, U.S. assessments say. Initial damage estimates suggested the setbacks were measured in months, and Iranian choices to delay rebuilding widened that window of reduced capacity.
Despite the disruption, the core elements that could support weaponization—most notably stockpiles of enriched material—remain intact, officials warn. Analysts argue Tehran retains the technical building blocks to reconstitute or accelerate parts of a program if political or security calculations change.
Shift from Ali Khamenei’s fatwa to Mojtaba’s reported views
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had publicly declared a religious prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons, a stance that was interpreted by many diplomats as a constraint on weaponization. U.S. intelligence argues that Mojtaba Khamenei did not share the same public hesitancy, and intercepted communications and reporting before the war indicated interest in more advanced warhead designs.
Officials caution, however, that a formal doctrinal reversal has not been announced and that the legacy fatwa constrained use rather than development. The debate inside Tehran, according to Western analysts, has long included factions pressing for rapid weaponization as a deterrent, and the current leadership changes have strengthened those voices.
Military options and operational constraints
Washington has presented a range of options to its national security decision-makers, including continued strikes, special operations planning and targeted campaigns to deny Iran safe havens for its nuclear work. Military planners say Pickaxe Mountain is a hard target for conventional airpower and that a ground incursion would carry significant risk and political cost.
U.S. officials emphasize that there has been no verified restart of enrichment at the relocated sites, though movement of equipment signals Tehran’s desire to shield its capabilities. The possibility that Iran could attempt to rebuild more rapidly in protected facilities complicates calculations about when and whether to use force to prevent further progress.
Regional repercussions and deterrence dynamics
Analysts and regional experts warn that the killing of senior Iranian figures and sustained attacks have intensified Tehran’s incentive to obtain a stronger deterrent against future interventions. Observers note that announcements by external partners to help Gulf states with enrichment infrastructure could further harden Iran’s resolve to seek a standalone deterrent.
The assessment that Mojtaba Khamenei may be more open to a weapons path raises difficult choices for Gulf capitals, which must weigh their security priorities against the risk of an expanded arms competition. Diplomats say the prospect of a more determined Iranian nuclear posture would drive deeper consultations among regional states and external powers over both defensive and diplomatic measures.
The U.S. judgment about Mojtaba Khamenei’s inclinations adds a fresh variable to an already volatile regional security environment, and officials say policy decisions now hinge on evolving intelligence, Iran’s on-the-ground moves and the political will in capitals to accept the risks of escalation.
